Clifford Geertz made the point very eloquently in his classic book ‘The interpretation of cultures’ — in his view, we should seek undertanding over explanation.

Of course, you’ve got to have theory, otherwise you get lost in relativism and historicism. But you can have too much of a good thing! Clausewitz himself sought a general theory of war, but wrote too about the difficulty of separating the particular from the general. In fact, his most enduring insights came after his acknowledgement, late in life, that not all war would be Napoleonic. He then started redrafting On War over again, but died having only completed the first book and revised a little more.

Meanwhile, I am greatly enjoying the tactics/strategy discussion here.

Cheers,

Ken

Well put. If one assumes, arguendo, that a state has a nuclear device, the ability to deliver it and the stated intention to do so, is this the kind of mortal danger where Clausewitz would see a close alignment of strategy and tactics? Do you think that Clausewitz under such circumstances would expect the defender to initiate a preemptive action (like taking the leg off)? If in fact Iran has or will have a nuclear device soon and the ability to deliver it, it could be that Israel is faced with a Hobson’s Choice. Not a preferred choice, but just the only choice or, no choice at all depending on one’s perspective.

This post stimulates worthwhile thinking on the N. Korea problem too. Aside from proliferation, the immediate threat doesn’t seem as clear as in the case of Iran. Given the uncertainty of what Kim Jong Il might do in response to a surgical military strike (land invasion of the south) there seems to be a greater space between the long term strategy and the short term tactical options than in Israel’s situation. Although, the Japanese might look at this problem differently.

Thanks for the introduction to Clausewitz!

SB

Things get more complicated when it’s not a sacroma that’s been diagnosed (and most diagnoses are not that). I’m going to give a few examples in subsequent posts.

Regarding the ‘modesty’ Ken was talking about: I think he meant, here at least, the way Clausewitz wrote about war and strategy. He was a great theorist but also, remember, taking actual notes as he was observing the real, messy business of war up close. The slaughter at Borodino, the disastrous crossing of the Berezina, etc. He seemed in awe of this sheer, overwhelming complexity of reality–chance–and that comes through in his writing. By contrast, a lot of other writers (ahem) sometimes get a bit too cocky while trying to develop their “big idea”.

I agree that the long term strategic goal (life), should in the forefront in chosing a strategy in my example. If the removal of the leg will only buy a month or two, then maybe doing nothing is a better tactical decision. Of course, questions to the soldier (the doctor) about the chance of achieving strategic goals is really really important.

Good evening everyone,

Steve

Or are you saying that more modesty is needed in the researching and then the writing about these topics?

Again, I am reminded of the opening lines in Stringfellow Barr’s essay on the beauty of dialectic in which he observes that we should try to control the I think that… urge and do more listening and questioning.

A, did Diogenes say we have two ears and one mouth for a reason?

My home state of Israel lost two wars recently (Lebanon and Gaza) that were “emotional responses” to attacks on the nation, but due to a lack of any political strategy and overall plan any military gains were lost leading to the reverse outcome Israel had hoped for.

As for Clausewitz’s main contribution hmm… Well, I most often use the remarkable trinity with students – passion, chance, and reason: which, as you note, he associated loosely with the people, military and government respectively. Of those, I am most interested in passion, which addresses the relationship between societies and war.

But his thoughts on luck, chance, and the fog of war are also important. Until recently, the US military employed an overly deterministic concept, called the Effects Based Approach, which did not reflect sufficiently on the complexities of human interactions in war. Much social science writing has suffered from the same tendency. Clausewitz’s emphasis on chance is a worthwhile reminder of the need for greater modesty.

Cheers,

Ken

Dialectic, trinities (ruler, population, army), “centers of gravity”, “culminating points” of offense and defense: much to ponder with Clausewitz. I try to make it easy in one chapter of my book.

I haven’t read Heuser or Strachan, but will put them on my list. What do you think of your own (ie, King’s College’s) Michael Howard’s admirably short introduction?

The big man can be tough going in parts — in the middle books of On War especially, and in his penchant for the dialectic and for trinities. But he is more readable than is often assumed, and as you suggest, he remains undoubtedly the most profound military theorist.

Could I recommend to new readers a couple of companion books? Beatrice Heuser’s ‘Reading Clausewitz’ and Hew Strachan’s ‘Clausewitz’s On War’ are both first rate, and really helped me understand Clausewitz’s thinking.

Cheers,

Ken.

PS – I can’t take credit for the Faceless Bureaucrat’s blogging – he’s another member of the team, blogging incognito for mysterious reasons…